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Case No. 20050112-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

John Edwards,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a clandestine drug
laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 and 5(d)-(f) (Supp. 2003). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was defendant's Fourth Amendment rights violated when the confidential
informant entered defendant's home at defendant's invitation.
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress.
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, \ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal

conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application
of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103 P.3d 699.
2. Was the search warrant supported by probable cause?
Standard of Review. Same as Issue 1.
3. Did the confidential informant's actions entrap defendant into
manufacturing methamphetamine as a matter of law where defendant was already
manufacturing methamphetamine when he met the confidential informant?
Standard of Review. A trial court's entrapment determination "presents a
mixed question of fact and law." State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, f 7, - Utah
Adv. Rep. —. "Although [the Court] review[s] factual findings for clear error and
legal conclusions for correctness, due to the factually sensitive nature of entrapment
cases [it] will affirm the trial court's decision 'unless [it] can hold, based on the given
facts, that reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether entrapment occurred/" Id.
(quoting State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1,3 (Utah App. 1995)). "Only when reasonable
minds could not differ can [the Court] find entrapment as a matter of law." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
U.S. Const., amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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Section 76-2-303, Utah Code, is also relevant to this appeal. The pertinent portions
of that statute are set forth in the body of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
After police searched his residence pursuant to a warrant, defendant was
charged with possession of a clandestine drug laboratory, unlawful possession of
methamphetamine in the presence of a minor, endangerment of a child, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 1-3. Defendant moved to suppress the
evidence seized from his home, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and through unlawful entrapment. R. 134-64. Following a
hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 184-86,250-53. Pursuant to a
plea agreement, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the clandestine
laboratory offense, reserving the right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to
suppress. R. 238-46. The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of five years to
life and defendant timely appealed. R. 266-69, 272. The Utah Supreme Court
transferred the appeal to this Court. R. 274.
Summary of Facts
During his parole, James Michael Maddocks was conducting drug buys for
the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force. SH: 39-41. He had successfully
made a few drug buys for the Task Force during that time. SH: 41. At some point
during his parole, Maddocks tested positive for drugs —a violation of his parole
agreement. SH: 9,18,41. To avoid revocation of parole, he agreed that "he would
3

do what he could to get several more buys done or do something greater/7 such as
produce someone who was manufacturing methamphetamine. SH: 9, 41-42. He
initially agreed to help bring about the arrest of a woman suspected of
manufacturing methamphetamine, but abandoned that effort when he found that
he could not get near her. SH: 9.
Maddocks subsequently met defendant through a mutual friend. SH: 8,10.
At that first encounter, defendant was both smoking methamphetamine and
handing it out to others.

SH: 32. Based on his own experiences and his

conversations with defendant, Maddocks suspected that defendant was
manufacturing methamphetamine.

SH: 11. Maddocks decided to "target"

defendant by "step[ping] into his world." SH: 11. After meeting with defendant a
second time, Maddocks notified Sgt. Keith Millett of the Task Force of his
suspicions. SH: 33-34. He told Sgt. Millett that he "met a guy (defendant) dabbling
in meth," that he was "selling it," and "smoking it," and that he suspected that he
was manufacturing it as well. SH: 42. He told Sgt. Millett that he would follow up
on his suspicions and report his progress. SH: 42.
During the course of the next several weeks, Maddocks gained the trust of
defendant. He did this in part by providing defendant with glass tubing used to
smoke methamphetamine. SH: 11-12,17. Defendant invited Maddocks into his
home some fifteen to twenty times during the course of their association. SH: 14,1819. Maddocks observed a meth lab in defendant's home during his first visit. SH:
15. At some point, Maddocks provided defendant with some iodine — an ingredient
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used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

SH: 12, 17, 43. That iodine,

however, proved useless so defendant and Maddocks went to Wal-Mart and
purchased small bottles of iodine. SH: 30-31.
After Maddocks gained entry into defendant's "world/' he notified the Task
Force that he had confirmed his suspicions. SH: 42. At one point, Maddocks
discussed with Sgt. Millett his desire to provide defendant with iodine. SH: 16,43.
But Sgt. Millett told him not to do so because they could not allow it to be used in a
"cook/' SH: 17,43. Sgt. Millett was never told that Maddocks did so anyway, nor
was he aware that Maddocks had also provided defendant with glass tubing to
smoke methamphetamine. SH: 12-13,17. Both Maddocks and Sgt. Millett testified
that at no time did the Task Force direct him to enter defendant's home or otherwise
direct his actions. SH: 20,34, 45.
On April 7, 2004, Maddocks went to defendant's house and witnessed
defendant cooking methamphetamine. SH: 21. He thereafter left defendant's house
and notified Sgt. Millett. SH: 21-22,46. Sgt. Millett secured a search warrant some
four hours later and executed a search of defendant's home. SH: 23,46. The Task
Force found defendant operating a meth lab in his home and in the presence of his
child. SH: 46. Maddocks testified that he never asked defendant to manufacture
methamphetamine for him. SH: 23-24.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The Confidential Informant's Activity in Defendant's Home. Defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when Maddocks entered his home.
First, no Fourth Amendment interests were implicated because Maddocks was not
an agent of the police. Second, even if Maddocks was an agent, defendant invited
him into the home. The law is well settled that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.
II. Probable Cause for the Search Warrant. Contrary to defendant's claim, the
magistrate had a "substantial basis" to conclude that the information provided by
Maddocks and set forth in the search warrant affidavit was reliable. It was detailed
and based on personal observation. It was consistent with the officer's extensive
experience and training in detecting methamphetamine operations. And it came
from an informant who had proved reliable in the past.
III. Entrapment Claim. Nor was defendant entrapped as a matter of law. In
the first place, Maddocks was not acting as a police agent. And in any event,
Maddocks did not in any way exploit his mutual association with defendant to
induce him into manufacturing methamphetamine. Nor did he so induce him by
providing iodine that ultimately proved useless. Maddocks did not make persistent
pleas for defendant to manufacture methamphetamine for him. Nor did he appeal
to pity or sympathy. Moreover, defendant cannot prevail on a claim of entrapment
where he was already engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
6

ARGUMENT
Defendant makes three claims on appeal. First, he claims that Maddocks's
entry into his residence constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth
Amendment. Aplt. Brf. at 12-23. Second, he claims that the search warrant was not
supported by probable cause. Aplt. Brf. at 23-31. And third, he claims that he was
entrapped as a matter of law. Aplt. Brf. at 31-37. All three claims fail.
I.
The Confidential Informant's Entry Into Defendant's Residence
Did Not Implicate the Fourth Amendment
Defendant argues that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant
should have been suppressed because the warrant was based on information
obtained by James Maddocks in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Aplt. Brf. at
12-23. Specifically, defendant argues that as a confidential informant, Maddocks
was an agent of the police and he thus violated the Fourth Amendment when he
entered defendant's home without a warrant. Aplt. Brf. at 22-23.
Defendant's claim fails at the outset because Maddocks was not acting as an
agent of the police. The law is well settled that the Fourth Amendment proscribes
only governmental action. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). It "does not
extend to the independent acts of private citizens/ 7 as was the case here. State v.
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219,1220 (Utah 1988). Although the Task Force was aware that
Maddocks was trying to gain defendant's trust and obtain information that would
incriminate him, it did not direct or exercise control over defendant's activities in
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the home. See SH: 12-13,16-17,43. Moreover, it was clear that defendant was acting
in his own self-interest—to avoid prosecution of the parole violation. Therefore,
under State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), Maddocks was not acting as an
agent of the police.
Defendant suggests that the Task Force directed Maddocks to target him, that
the Task Force provided defendant with an essential methamphetamine precursor
through Maddocks, and that the Task Force exploited the mutual affiliation shared
by defendant and Maddocks in inducing defendant to set up a clandestine drug lab.
Aplt. Brf. at 17. These assertions are void of record support.

The evidence

established that the Task Force was not aware of defendant before Maddocks told
them about him, let alone that he belonged to the same white supremacist group as
Maddocks. SH: 42. The evidence also established that Maddocks secured the
methamphetamine precursor independent of the Task Force, SH: 12-13, 17, 43.
Indeed, defendant as much as admits on appeal that Maddocks was not an agent,
conceding that Maddocks "was not supervised or acting under the control or
direction of the task force." Aplt. Brf. at 30.
Assuming, arguendo, that Maddocks was acting as an agent of the police, he
did nothing that violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. This case is
governed by Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), and State v. McArthur, 2000
UT App 23, 996 P.2d 555, cert denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2002).
In Hoffa, a Teamster's Union official under federal indictment made numerous
visits over a four-week period to the hotel suite of Jimmy Hoffa during Hoffa's
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criminal trial for violating the Taft-Hartley Act. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 296,87 S.Ct. at 410.
During these visits, Hoffa discussed with the union official and other associates his
plans to bribe jurors. Id. Unbeknownst to Hoffa, and pursuant to a previous
agreement with federal authorities, the union official regularly reported these
conversations to federal agents. Id. at 296, 298,87 S.Ct. at 410-11. In exchange for
his disclosures, federal charges previously filed against the union official were either
dropped or not actively pursued. Id. at 298, 87 S.Ct. at 411. Based in large part on
the information provided by the union official, Hoffa was charged and convicted of
bribery. Id. at 296, 87 S.Ct. at 410.
On certiorari, Hoffa argued that" deceptively placing a secret informer in [his]
quarters and councils" violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 295. The United
States Supreme Court rejected the argument. The Court acknowledged that "the
Fourth Amendment protects . . . the security a man relies upon when he places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his
office, his hotel room or his automobile." Id. at 301. But the Court explained that
the risk of being betrayed by an informant "'is the kind of risk we necessarily
assume whenever we speak/" Id. at 303 (citation omitted). The Court thus held that
no Fourth Amendment right was violated in the case because "the Fourth
Amendment [does not] protect[ ] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Id. at 301-02.
In McArthur, the defendant's on again-off again girlfriend was picked up by
police for forging checks stolen in a home burglary three months earlier. McArthur,
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2000 UT App 23, % 2. She told the investigating officer that defendant committed
the burglary and provided a detailed description of the burglary and the stolen
items. Id. at ^ 2, 4. She told the officer that some of the stolen property was in
defendant's mother's home, where defendant lived, and offered to retrieve it. Id. at
f 5. Although defendant's girlfriend no longer lived with defendant, she stayed
there periodically, kept some belongings there, and was always welcome. Id. at ^f 3.
Agreeing to her offer, the officer drove defendant's girlfriend to defendant's house.
Id. at Iffl 5-6. She entered the home, found defendant and his niece there, gathered
some belongings, took two stolen items, and returned to the patrol car. Id. at f f 6-7.
Relying on Hoffa, the Court in McArthur rejected the defendant's claim that his
girlfriend's actions violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court recognized that
"[t]he Constitution tolerates undercover investigations by informants who conceal
their status as police agents." Id. at If 20. The Court explained that "'a privacy
interest, in the constitutional lexicon, consists of a reasonable expectation that
uninvited and unauthorized persons will not intrude into a particular area.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). On the other
hand, the Court held, "the Fourth Amendment has no application to the actions of
invited and authorized persons, even when, unbeknownst to the unwary, they are
acting as police agents." Id.
Like the defendants in Hoffa and McArthur, defendant welcomed an informant
into his home and thus assumed the risk of being betrayed by that informant. SH:
14, 21. Having assumed that risk, he can claim no Fourth Amendment violation.
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Just as Jimmy Hoff a did "not rely [ ] on the security of his hotel suite when he
made the incriminating statements" in the presence of the informant, defendant
here did not rely on the security of his home when he exposed his illegal activities to
Maddocks. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302. Maddocks "did not enter the [home] by force or
by stealth." See id. "He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper." See id. He was in
the home "by invitation" and defendant knowingly exposed to Maddocks his
criminal activity therein. See id.; SH: 18-19. Defendant, therefore, "was not relying
on the security of the [home], but "upon his misplaced confidence that [Maddocks]
would not reveal his wrongdoing." See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
Defendant nevertheless contends that Maddocks could not enter defendant's
home because under State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991), "the
government cannot use informants to do for them what they cannot legally do
themselves." Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. But as explained in McArthur, "[t]he Fourth
Amendment permits [an officer] to have [a confidential informant] do whatever he
could do if he were [the confidential informant], i.e., if he had the run of the house."
McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, % 20 n.4. As in McArthur, defendant "welcomed [the
confidential informant] into his private sphere and candidly exposed to [him] the
fruits of his illegal activity." Id. at | 21. Accordingly, [t]he risk that [Maddocks]
would choose to cooperate with authorities and reveal what [he] saw and heard was
borne by defendant alone."

Id. Under these circumstances, "[t]he Fourth

Amendment offers no protection from the consequences of defendant's misplaced
trust." Id.
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In summary, defendant's conduct was "'inconsistent with an expectation of
privacy'" in the home and "'operate[d] to neutralize his protected interest therein/"
Id. at Tf 18 (quoting Lyons, 706 F.2d at 328). Because he knowingly exposed his
illegal activity to Maddocks, that activity '"is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. ,,, Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347).
II.
The Search Warrant Was Supported By Probable Cause.
Defendant next argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable
cause. Aplt. Brf. at 23-31. Specifically, defendant contends that "[t]here is not stated
in the affidavit any information suggesting that the information provided by
[Maddocks] was corroborated through an independent source or that the
information was corroborated through observation or surveillance by the task
force/' Aplt. Brf. at 25. Defendant also asks the Court to discount the affiant's
statement that Maddocks had previously provided information that led to an arrest,
claiming that it proved to be false. Aplt. Brf. at 25. This argument also fails.
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the United States Supreme Court
explained that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit. . . , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place/' Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The Court recognized that an
informant's reliability and basis of knowledge are relevant factors in the analysis,
but explained that "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the
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overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other
indicia of reliability/ 7 Id. at 233.
Moreover, in reviewing a magistrate's issuance of a warrant, the task of the
appellate court does "not take the form of de novo review/' Id. at 236. Instead, "the
duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial
basis for . .. conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed." Id. at 238-39 (citation
omitted). In other words, the reviewing court should pay "great deference" to the
magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. at 236. The information in the
affidavit easily satisfies this standard.
As stated by defendant, the affidavit of probable cause in this case rested
primarily on information provided by James Maddocks—referred to in the affidavit
only as the "confidential informant" (CI). R. 28-23. The affidavit stated that the CI
provided police with the following information:
(1) the CI met defendant "through other known drug users and has
known [defendant] for a couple of months," R. 26;
(2) the CI built a relationship of trust with defendant through their
mutual association in a white supremacist group known as the
"Peckerwoods," R. 26-25;
(3) the CI has viewed phosphorous, ephedrine, iodine, glassware,
and other items that are consistent with the manufacture of
methamphetamine, R. 25;
(4) the CI has helped defendant "weigh and package the finished
product, methamphetamine, for sale and distribution," R. 25;
(5) at approximately 3:00 p.m. on the day the warrant was sought,
he CI saw defendant mixing ephedrine, phosphorous, and iodine in a
flask that was sitting on an electric burner, R. 25;
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(6) the CI has observed that "it usually takes [defendant] about ten
hours to cook a batch of methamphetamine/ 7 R. 25-24; and
(7) the CI has observed that defendant uses the white shed behind
his house to store chemicals used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine, R. 24.
The affidavit also provided information that supported a belief that the
foregoing information was reliable.

For example, the detailed description of

defendant's methamphetamine operation was consistent with the affiant's training
and experience.

The affidavit established that the affiant was a trained and

experienced officer in the detection and investigation of methamphetamine labs. R.
27-26 ( | 1). The affiant then confirmed that the chemicals and lab equipment which
the CI reported seeing at defendant's residence are consistent with that which are
used to produce methamphetamine. R. 25 (f 6). The affiant confirmed that the
"described actions [of defendant] are consistent of one in the process of producing
methamphetamine." R. 25 (^[ 6). And finally, the affiant confirmed that the CI's
report that it took defendant about ten hours to cook methamphetamine was
consistent with the affiant's

experience

that the process of

producing

methamphetamine, "depending upon the cooking method used, can take up to ten
hours." R. 25 fl[ 6).
In addition, the affidavit provided information that supported a belief that the
CI was reliable. The affiant reported that the CI had "worked with the task force on
previous occasions and ha[d] provided reliable information that led to the arrest of a
particular suspect the task force had been monitoring." R. 26 (f 2). Specifically, the
affiant explained that the CI "conducted two (2) 'controlled buys' wherein the
14

informant was wired with an electronic transmitting device and given task force
money to complete the transactions." R. 26 (^f 2). The affiant reported that the CI
"arranged the transactions and then followed through under the surveillance and
supervision of the task force agents." R. 26 (^f 2). The affiant then confirmed that
"[e]ach time the information provided by the informant proved reliable and
methamphetamine was purchased from the suspect." R. 26 (f 2).
Defendant claims that these assertions proved to be false. Aplt. Brf. at 25. To
the contrary, testimony at the suppression hearing supported the affiant's
assertions.
In support of his claim that Maddocks had not previously provided
information leading to an arrest, defendant points to Maddocks' failed efforts to
help bring down a woman who was suspected of manufacturing methamphetamine. Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. It is true that Maddocks had initially agreed to work
off his parole violation by helping police arrest the suspected woman and
abandoned that effort when he found out "[tjhere was no way that [he] could get
near" her. SH: 9-10. But that failure was not Maddocks's only dealing with the Task
Force. Sgt. Millett testified that Maddocks had been helping the Task Force before
Sgt. Millett joined the Task Force and "had purchased some methamphetamine from
some other individuals prior to my arrival." SH: 41 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary
to defendant's claim, the affiant's assertion that Maddocks had previously provided
reliable information did not prove to be false.
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Defendant also complains that the affidavit failed to disclose that Maddocks
had violated the terms of his parole and had worked out an arrangement with the
task force to keep from going back to prison." Aplt. Brf. at 30. Defendant did not
make this argument below. See 164-44; SH: 58-69. The trial court, however, was
bothered by the affidavit's failure to indicate "why the confidential informant was
cooperating" and concluded that such information "may be helpful... to the court."
SH: 83. The court nevertheless concluded that even had the information been made
known to the court, it "would not have changed the court's position with regard to a
finding of probable cause to conduct the search." SH: 84.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the omission of information in a search
warrant affidavit will require suppression of the evidence only if the omitted fact
"materially affects the finding of probable cause." State v. Nielsen,727 R2d 188,191
(Utah 1986). The trial court properly concluded that probable cause is not lacking
when the omitted information is considered. Indeed, notwithstanding the omission,
the affidavit was sufficient to notify the magistrate that the CI's motives were
suspect. Where the affidavit identified the informant as a "confidential informant,
rather than a "citizen informant," the magistrate could fairly infer that the CI was
involved in the criminal element and providing the information to gain some kind
of favor from police, whether it was money or a deal in a criminal case. Confidential
informants who conduct controlled buys and associate with those in the drug
business as they conduct that business are rarely found among law-abiding citizens.
Moreover, the magistrate was made aware that the CI was a member of the
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Peckerwoods, a white supremacist group. R. 26-25 (^ 3). In other words, inclusion
of the CI's purpose in providing the information would have added little, if
anything, to the magistrate's analysis.
***

In sum, the magistrate had a "substantial basis" to conclude that the
information provided by Maddocks was reliable. It was detailed and based on
personal observation. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 (holding that even if an informant's
motives are suspect, "his explicit and detailed description of the alleged
wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles
his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case"). It was consistent with
the officer's extensive experience and training in detecting methamphetamine
operations. See id. at 242 (observing that "an officer 'may rely upon information
received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as
the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the
officer's knowledge'"). And it came from an informant who had proved reliable in
the past. See State v. Doyle, 918 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1996) (concluding that
informant's tip "was deemed to be reliable because th[e] informant had provided
the police with reliable information in the past").
III.
Defendant Was Not Entrapped as a Matter of Law.
Finally, defendant argues that he was entrapped as a matter of law. Aplt. Brf.
at 31-36. He claims that he was entrapped because Maddocks exploited his
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relationship with defendant as a fellow member of the Peckerwoods and provided
defendant with an essential ingredient (iodine), without which "there [was] no way
that the Appellant could have manufactured [the] methamphetamine/ , Aplt. Brf. at
32-35. This claim also fails.
Utah's entrapment statute provides in relevant part as follows:
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution
by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1) (1999). The entrapment statute, therefore, requires
government action. As discussed above, defendant was not an agent of the State.
Accordingly, he cannot prevail on a claim of entrapment. Assuming, arguendo, that
defendant was an agent, his claim still fails.
The entrapment statute requires an objective review that "focuses solely on
the actions of the government, and not on the defendant's predisposition, to
determine whether entrapment has occurred/' State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1,3 (Utah
App. 1995). Under this standard, "'the pivotal questions are: (1) "does the conduct
of the government comport with a fair and honorable administration of justice," and
(2) did the governmental conduct create a substantial risk that an average person
would be induced to commit the crime defendant committed?" Id. (quoting State v.
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted)).
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In considering whether government action improperly induced criminal
conduct or merely afforded the defendant the opportunity to commit an offense,
this Court considers "the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction
between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the inducements of the
agent." State v. Taylor, 599 R2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979). This Court has identified
several examples of what might constitute entrapment, "depending on an
evaluation of the circumstances of each case": (1) "extreme pleas of desperate
illness," (2) "appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal
friendship," (3) "offers of inordinate sums of money," and (4) "excessive pressure or
goading."

State v. J.D.W., 910 P.2d 1242, 1243-44 (Utah App. 1995) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). The evidence at the suppression hearing did not
established entrapment.
Maddocks testified that when he first met defendant, he was smoking and
selling methamphetamine, and admitted to manufacturing it. SH: 42. He testified
that he saw a meth lab in defendant's house the first time he visited defendant there.
SH: 15. Thus, even if Maddocks at some point provided defendant with iodine, it
cannot be said that Maddocks entrapped him into manufacturing methamphetamine. He was already doing so. "'[W]here it is known or suspected that a person
is engaged in criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is not an entrapment to
provide an opportunity for such person to carry out his criminal intentions.'" State
v. Torres, 2000 UT 100, % 14,16 P.3d 1242 (citation omitted).
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Moreover, the fact that Maddocks may have gained defendant's trust through
their mutual membership in the Peckerwoods did not constitute entrapment. As
recognized by this Court in Torres, informants "must have some means of gaining
the trust of those involved in buying and selling drugs/' Id. at ^ 13. Where, as here,
that mutual association is merely used to gain the trust of a dealer or manufacturer,
there is no entrapment. See id. Contrary to defendant's claim, nothing in the record
suggests that Maddocks appealed to their association in the Peckerwoods to induce
defendant to manufacture the drug. Nor did the record suggest that Maddocks
appealed to sympathy or pity or made persistent pleas that defendant manufacture
the methamphetamine.
In sum, based on the foregoing facts, it cannot be said that defendant was
entrapped as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendant's final claim also fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
ORAL ARGUMENT
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals,
2005 UT 18,110,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560
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(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
Respectfully submitted October 20, 2005.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
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^
^/Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AM) FOR IRON COUNTY,
/OOHAPR

STATE OF UTAH

^ '^

1 2 AM 8 = 3 8

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ?ni

/

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )

Before the Honorable G. Michael Westfall, Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County,
State of Utah:
The undersigned, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
That your affiant, Keith Millett, is the Commander of the Iron\Garfield Counties
Narcotics Task Force (ICGNTF) and has been a peace officer for in excess of 14 years and has
reason to believe the following, to wit:
That within the residence known as the John Edwards residence, located at 364 lA South
100 West, Cedar City, Utah, your affiant believes there is evidence of drug activity, including the
manufacture of a controlled substance. Said residence is more particularly described as a white
rambler style home with brown trim and an apartment downstairs wherein Mr. Edwards resides.
The number 364 is affixed to the front of the home, which faces East and there is a large pine tree
located in the front yard. Access to the basement apartment is on the south side of the residence
with a set of stairs leading down to the door. A photograph of the home is attached hereto and
incorporated by this reference. Next to the home is a white shed (the only shed on the premises).
located on the north-west corner of the property in the back yard. John Edwards has access to
store items in the shed pursuant to the lease agreement. Your affiant asserts that within the
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Edwards residence and within the white shed to which Edwards has access and in Edward's
vehicle, a grey 2000 Audi vehicle (License Plate # 054 MNZ), there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
The controlled substance methamphetamine, together with
methamphetamine laboratory equipment (glassware, ephedrine, red
phosphorous and iodine); and solvents and other chemicals used in
the production of methamphetamine (coleman fuel, red-devil lye,
and sulphuric acid); and records, notes, and papers related to the
production or manufacturing of methamphetamine; and drug
paraphernalia.
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, is being
possessed with a purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense,
and/or consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the
illegal conduct.
I believe that the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and Unlawful
Production\Manufacture of Methamphetamine, and that said offenses constitute felonies under
the laws of the State of Utah. The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a search warrant
are as follows:
1.

Commander Millett has been a peace officer in excess of fourteen years. He is
currently assigned to the Iron/Garflied Narcotics Task Force and previously spent
approximately 2 lA years with the task force from 1997-2000. Commander Millett
has attended training classes related to the detection and investigation of narcotics
and the production of methamphetamine. Commander Millett is a graduate of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency's school on clandestine laboratory
2
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investigation and the Clandestine Laboratory Investigators Academy clandestine
laboratory school. These two training academies teach, among other narcotics
investigation skills, law enforcement agents to detect the ingredients, precursors,
and "cooking" methods of manufacturing methamphetamine. Commander
Millett, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and Commander with the
Iron/Garfield Narcotics Task Force, has almost daily contact with
methamphetamine, methamphetamine users, and/or methamphetamine laboratory
equipment or supplies.
2.

Commander Millett has received information, from a confidential informant, that
a methamphetamine lab is in operation at the John Edwards residence. The
confidential informant has worked with the task force on previous occasions and
has provided reliable information that led to the arrest of a particular suspect the
task force had been monitoring. This arrest occurred in the latter part of 2003.
Specifically, the confidential informant conducted two (2) "controlled buys"
wherein the informant was wired with an electronic transmitting device and given
task force buy money to complete the transactions. The informant arranged the
transactions and then followed through under the surveillance and supervision of
the task force agents. Each time the information provided by the informant
proved reliable and methamphetamine was purchased from the suspect.

3.

The confidential informant asserts that he met John Edwards through other known
drug users and has known Mr. Edwards for a couple of months. The informant
asserts that he and Mr. Edwards are associated with a group called the
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"Peckerwoods", a white supremacist group, and have built a relationship of trust
through this association.
4.

The confidential informant has been reporting for approximately three (3) weeks
that John Edwards is manufacturing methamphetamine from his apartment located
at the address described above. The informant stated that the informant has
viewed phosphorous, ephedrine, iodine, glassware and other items that are
consistent with methamphetamine production. The informant stated that he has
helped John Edwards weigh and package the finished product, methamphetamine,
for sale and distribution.

5.

Today, April 7, 2004, at approximately 3:00 p.m. the informant stated that he was
in the John Edwards residence and viewed John Edwards in the process of
cooking methamphetamine. Specifically, the informant reported that Edwards
was mixing chemicals (ephedrine, phosphorous, and iodine) in a flask which was
sitting upon an electric burner. This information was received by your affiant at
approximately 4:00 p.m.

6.

Your affiant asserts that John Edwards has the chemicals and laboratory
equipment to produce the controlled substance, methamphetamine and that the
above described actions are consistent with one in the process of producing
methamphetamine. Further, your affiant asserts that Edwards was and still may be
in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine based upon the information
provided herein. Your affiant asserts that the process, depending upon the
cooking method used, can take up to ten hours. The informant told your affiant
4

that it usually takes Mr. Edwards about ten hours to cook a batch of
methamphetamine.
7.

The informant stated that Mr. Edwards uses the white shed behind the residence to
store chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine. In addition, the
informant stated that Mr. Edwards will often leave his residence in a grey 2000
Audi, registered to Natalie Muir (wife of John Edwards), with the finished
product, methamphetamine. In your affiants training and experience with
methamphetamine production and distribution it is common for suspects to store
chemicals and laboratory equipment along with finished product in storage sheds
and vehicles.

8.

Your affiant requests that this warrant be authorized for nighttime service as your
affiant would like to search the residence prior to the cooking process being
completed. In addition, the finished product could be moved away from the
residence prior to your affiant being able to serve the warrant should the warrant
be authorized for daytime service only.

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said
items set forth herein and located within the John Edwards residence, the above-described white
storage shed, and the grey 2000 Audi vehicle located in Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah,
and being more particularly described herein.
Your affiant further requests that said Search Warrant be served, in daytime or nighttime
with the requirement that law enforcement officers knock or announce their presence prior to
serving the Search Warrant.
5

Dated this ^

day of April, 2004

Commander Keith Milfett, affiant
Iron Garfield County Task Force

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7

day of April, 2004 at the hour of

?-^ I

p.m.
'G. Micha^%o#all
District Court Judge
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DEC 2 8 2004
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY
DEPUTY CLERK

SCOTT GARRETT (#8687)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 586-6694
Fax: (435) 586-2737

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR LIMIT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 041500206

JOHN EDWARDS,

Judge G. Michael Westfall

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on December 10,2004, for purposes
of a suppression hearing, and both parties having submitted briefs on the suppression issues, and the
Court having listened to testimony from witnesses for both parties, and oral argument having been
made, and the matter having been submitted to the Court, the Court now makes and enters the
following Findings of Fact and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Limit as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the defense has the burden of establishing that the confidential

informant was acting as a government agent.

2.

The Court finds that the defense has not presented sufficient evidence to believe that

the confidential informant was acting as a government agent.
3.

The Court finds that the confidential informant was not a government agent but,

rather, was a private citizen for Fourth Amendment purposes.
4.

The Court finds that because the confidential informant was not acting as a

government agent during the contested search on April 7, 2004, the Fourth Amendment has nof
application to that search, and, therefore, the search was not illegal or invalid.
5.

The Court finds that there were three deficiencies in the search warrant presented for

the judge's signature on April 7, 2004, to wit:
A.

The search warrant indicated that the confidential informant had conducted

two (2) previous controlled buys with the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force. However,
the Court only heard testimony regarding one (1) previous controlled buy by the confidential
informant.
B.

The search warrant failed to indicate why the confidential informant was

cooperating with the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force or what promises had been made
to the confidential informant in exchange for his assistance. The Court finds that the confidential
informant was promised that, in exchange for information regarding substance abuse in Iron County,
the confidential informant may have a probation violation dismissed against him.
C.

The search warrant failed to mention any independent surveillance that had

been done by Commander Keith Millett to corroborate the confidential informant's information
about the Defendant conducting a methamphetamine lab in his residence.
6.

The Court finds that the deficiencies in the search warrant would not have changed

the Court's decision in finding probable cause to conduct the search. Therefore, the Court finds that
the search warrant ultimately obtained by the Task Force on April 7, 2004, is valid and upheld.
2
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7.

The Court finds that there was sufficient corroboration by the confidential informant

and law enforcement to uphold the search warrant. Specifically, the confidential informant and
Commander Millett had several conversations in the three (3) weeks prior to the date that the
Defendant was arrested. The Court finds that, during that time, the confidential informant kept
Commander Millett apprised of the Defendant's activities and the fact that he had laboratory
equipment in his home and was in the process of preparing to cook methamphetamine.
8.

Additionally, the Court finds substantial corroboration for the search warrant as it

relates to the issue of reliability contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the search warrant. The Court
finds that the confidential informant had previously participated in a controlled buy with the Task
Force which resulted in the arrest and prosecution of a particular defendant.
9.

The Court does not find, as a matter of law, that the Defendant was entrapped in this

particular case. However, the Court does find that there is sufficient evidence to allow the issue of
entrapment to be presented to the jury in the form of a jury instruction.
ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following order:
1.

The confidential informant was not acting as a government agent during his entry of

the Defendant's residence on April 7, 2004, and, therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment
violation.
2.

Despite certain deficiencies in the search warrant, those deficiencies were incidental

and would not have changed the Court's decision as to probable cause; therefore, the search warrant
is valid and upheld.
3.

The Defendant was not entrapped into committing this offense as a matter of law.

However, enough evidence exists to allow the Defendant to present the issue of entrapment to a jury
as a defense.

4.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Limit is denied.

DATED this

. day of December, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

* **»» "« b *» >

/G/klfaimL
WESTFALLa-v
District Court Ju&gs

CERTIFIC

F HAND-DELIVERY

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS OR LIMIT, on this. £~*~ day of December, 2004, to J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for
Defendant, at the office of the Iron County Attorney, 97 North Main Street, Suite 1, Cedar City, Utah
84720.
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